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Who Is Responsible for Ukraine? 
by Tammy Lynch 
 
Negotiations to form a new Ukrainian government once again broke down on 
Saturday, as President Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party pulled out of talks 
with fellow “orange” parties, The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko and the Socialist 
Party. 
 
Three months after the country’s parliamentary elections, its leaders appear 
helpless and hapless, unable to govern the country even as it faces some of the 
most difficult challenges in its modern history. And now, after numerous rounds 
of negotiations, President Yushchenko suddenly has removed himself from the 
process, suggesting that it is not his responsibility to help form the government. 
 
In 2006, Ukraine became a parliamentary-presidential republic. The cabinet is 
now responsible for most day-to-day domestic policy, but the president maintains 
general oversight, with significant powers of decree, as well as control over the 
security services and foreign policy. On Saturday, Yushchenko implied that this 
structure absolves him of the duty to help form a new government. (1) The 
president unexpectedly made this statement after being intimately involved in the 
process for almost three months. 
 
Since the election, the country has been run by an acting government with little 
apparent interest in reform. Economic growth has slowed, debts accumulated by 
the country’s domestic gas supplier reportedly now total approximately 1 billion 
dollars, foreign investors have stayed away because of political instability, 
protests have erupted over plans to hike energy tariffs, a delivery of military 
construction materials to Crimea by a US carrier resulted in sustained protests 
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against the US and NATO, US President George W. Bush nixed a tentative trip 
to the country, and Russia announced that gas prices for Ukraine could double 
on 1 July. 
 
And yet, there has been no rush by either Yushchenko or his Our Ukraine party 
to form a new government. In fact, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine spent the better 
part of the last two months refusing to accept that, since the election bloc of 
former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko finished more than 8 points ahead of 
Our Ukraine in the election and would be the biggest party in the proposed 
coalition, Tymoshenko should be premier. Talks were suspended more than 
once by Our Ukraine in protest against this claim. Two weeks ago, Yushchenko’s 
press service released a statement pointing out that the president must submit 
the name of the premier for confirmation by parliament, and that by law he can 
refuse to submit the premier suggested by the majority coalition. (2) This 
announcement was seen to be aimed clearly at Tymoshenko. 
 
However, finally, on Friday, almost three months after the election, President 
Yushchenko announced that he supported the idea that the largest party in the 
coalition should name the premier. (3) 
 
The next day, suddenly and without warning, Our Ukraine pulled out of the talks; 
President Yushchenko then suggested that it was Tymoshenko’s job, not his, to 
form a coalition. 
 
"I believe that the politician seeking to become prime minister must take 
responsibility for creating a coalition," he said in his weekly radio address. "This 
is European practice, this is common sense, this is a norm of Ukraine's 
Constitution." (4) 
 
Yushchenko apparently would like to suggest that it would be Tymoshenko’s 
responsibility, not his, if the coalition negotiations fail. 
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If only he had told her sooner. 
 
According to Ukraine’s constitution, a parliamentary majority coalition must be 
created within 30 days of the first sitting of the newly elected parliament. The 
deadline, therefore, is 25 June. Even more importantly, parliament has been 
unable to convene successfully since no majority exists. 
 
Its next session is 14 June, when the body is scheduled to discuss important 
issues, including authorization of Ukraine’s participation in international military 
exercises. Without the majority coalition, this measure will not pass, leaving 
Ukraine potentially in violation of several major international agreements. 
Already, a joint Ukrainian-British exercise has been postponed—in spite of the 
British outlay already reportedly totaling over $200,000—because of the lack of 
parliamentary authorization. 
 
Since Yushchenko and Our Ukraine only agreed to allow Tymoshenko to 
become premier on 8 June, she therefore effectively has 7 days to form a 
workable coalition. And she is to do so with a party whose “honorary” leader 
seems to have withdrawn from the process. It is no surprise, then, that 
Tymoshenko seemed slightly shell-shocked at a press conference following the 
president’s statements. 
 
So why did Our Ukraine pull out of talks? Ostensibly, the party suggests that it 
could not accept the demand by the Socialists that their leader, Oleksandr 
Moroz, become speaker of parliament. The reasoning seems questionable, 
however. 
 
Moroz has made it clear since the first week after the election that his party 
wants only one major position – the speakership. This demand has not 
hampered the negotiations; in fact, after weeks of discussions, Our Ukraine’s 
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political leadership announced that all coalition members had agreed on an 
approximately 100-page program of action. (5) Throughout these discussions, 
Moroz’s requirement for participation was clear. 
 
Our Ukraine is now insisting that one of its members receive the position of 
speaker. Our Ukraine spokeswoman Tatyana Mokridi said, “The Socialist Party 
strongly insists that its head, Alexander [sic] Moroz, be given the post of speaker. 
However, Our Ukraine insists on proportional distribution based on the results of 
the elections.” (6) In other words, Mokridi suggests that since Our Ukraine had 
the second-best results of the three coalition partners, it should have the right to 
the second highest position available to be filled by the coalition partners. 
 
In a fully parliamentary republic, this would be the case. However, Ukraine is a 
parliamentary-presidential republic and the position of president cannot be 
ignored. Ukraine’s system of governance places a similar level of power in the 
hands of the president and prime minister, although the historical authority of the 
presidential position makes it far more formidable when used to its capacity. 
 
Despite attempts by the president’s aides to suggest otherwise, President 
Yushchenko clearly represents Our Ukraine. The party featured him in its 
election ads, lists him as its honorary party leader, and distributed campaign 
material carrying the slogan, “The Party of Yushchenko.” Yushchenko himself 
spoke at the organizational 2005 Our Ukraine party conference, his closest 
friends are party leaders, and his brother and nephew represent the party as 
Members of Parliament. 
 
If the country is striving for a governing coalition based on balance and fairness, 
Yushchenko’s position representing the interests of Our Ukraine cannot be 
dismissed. 
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Additionally, Ukraine’s constitution allows the president to unilaterally appoint the 
secretary of the powerful National Security and Defense Council, the head of the 
Security Services, the Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, Defense Minister and all 
25 regional governors. Yushchenko has insisted these positions be removed 
from consideration in coalition negotiations. (7) Most, if not all, will almost 
certainly be filled by representatives of Our Ukraine. 
 
Why, then, with its representatives in most of the major positions governing the 
country, does Our Ukraine object to Oleksandr Moroz as speaker? 
 
Tymoshenko bluntly suggested Saturday that the reason given by Our Ukraine 
was simply a “pretext” to disguise the fact that Our Ukraine’s leadership does not 
want to reform the “orange coalition.” Instead, she said, its leaders would rather 
form a coalition with the party of President Yushchenko’s defeated presidential 
opponent, Viktor Yanukovich. (8) This suggestion is given weight by the recent 
creation of an “inter-party parliamentary alliance” by certain members of Our 
Ukraine and Yanukovich’s Party of Regions. (9) Most Our Ukraine members in 
this alliance appear to have business or financial interests that coincide with 
those of the Party of Regions. 
 
If this is the case, Our Ukraine’s attack against Moroz is even more disturbing, 
given Moroz’s long history of fighting against corruption and for democracy. 
 
It was neither Yushchenko nor Tymoshenko who first stood up to publicly accuse 
President Leonid Kuchma of involvement in the death of Goergiy Gongadze: It 
was Oleksandr Moroz and the Socialists. And it was Moroz who led protests 
against Kuchma while most others were biding their time. Love him or hate him, 
there is little doubt that Oleksandr Moroz was as vital as Tymoshenko and 
Yushchenko to the protest movement that eventually led to the Orange 
Revolution – and Yushchenko’s presidency. 
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The question now is whether Moroz will once again become a vital part of the 
opposition, or whether he will be allowed to use his skills as the speaker of 
parliament. The answer will demonstrate whether Ukraine truly is serious about 
embracing democratic governance, coalition-building and transparency. 
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